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Classifying Supreme Court Con-
currences: The Case of Justice Clarence 
Thomas · 
Char les C. Turn er 
California State University, Chico 
Lori Beth Way 
California State University, Chico 
Literature on the courts has demonstrated a rise in con-
currences on the Supreme Court, but little attention has 
been given to the content of concurring opinions . Such 
an exp/ oration has become crucial , as the number of 
concurrences has increased in recent decades, revealing 
a heightened sense of ideological division on the Court . 
Informed by new institutional concerns we contend that 
analysis of concurrences may provide evidence regarding 
how justices consider the institutional legitimacy of the 
Cour t, how they deal with precedent as a constraint 
and / or tool for their decision making , how they feed po-
litical discourse by attending to particular positions, and 
how poli t ics are constituted within the Court . We develop 
a se t of codes for classifying the content of concurring 
opinions as "Groundlaying," "Signaling," "Preserving," 
"Defending," or "Weakening." We apply the codes to 
empirical data by examining the concurrences of Justice 
Clarence Thomas. We conclu de that this coding scheme, 
with some minor adaptations, will be an effective tool for 
understanding the concurring behavior of the Court . 
• Authors ' Note: The authors thank Christopher Banks, John Maltese, and Nancy 
Maveety for helpful comments, and Tinsley Yarbrough for chairing the conference panel 
which included an earlier draft of this work. We also wish to thank Jessica Bernier and 
Cynthia Bynoe for their research assistance . The authors contributed equally to this pro-
ject 
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"I plead with y ou that, whatever you do, don 't try to 
apply the rules of the political world to this institution; 
they do not apply. "-Clarence Thomas 1 
Understandably, in the study of Supreme Court decisions, most researchers focus on majority opinions because these become the law of the land. However, research has 
illustrated that dissents and concurrences can have a unique, if 
often delayed, influence in providing grounds for future recon-
sideration of the law by the Supreme Court, and may provide 
reasons to overturn the original ruling (see, for example, Primus 
1998). In addition, the growth in the number of separate opinions 
over time suggests a need for scholarly attentiveness; there were, 
for example, ten times more concurring opinions written in the 
1980s than there were in the 1940s.2 Our goal here is to focus on 
understanding the content of concurrences. Specifically, we seek 
out patterns in concurring behavior by classifying the content of 
these opinions according to five broad categories that we outline 
below. In brief, informed by new institutional concerns we inves-
tigate five broad themes of concurring behavior: Groundlaying, 
Signaling, Preserving, Defending, and Weakening. Because this 
is a first attempt at systematically accounting for the content of 
such opinions, we focus on the concurrences of a single justice, 
Clarence Thomas, to assess the relevance of the codes we have 
generated. The questions we explore are what goals are demon-
strated in concurring opinions? Do justices attempt to lay legal 
foundations for future cases? Do concurrences send messages to 
potential litigants regarding which cases to pursue? Do concur-
rences merely note justices' unique perspectives? Do justices 
1 Statement from a speech to high school students in 2000. Quoted in Thomas (2001, 
586) , 
2 Supreme Court A to Z (2002). 
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reveal institutional and political concerns in separate opinions? 
Analysis of Thomas's concurrences allows us to offer tentative 
answers to these questions. 
Since our main objective is to ascertain the accuracy and 
relevance of our proposed codes, we focus on only one justice as 
a case study. We selected Clarence Thomas because of the cur-
rent Court members, he will likely be on the bench the longest. 
In a 1993 New York Times article he was quoted as saying: "The 
liberals made my life miserable for 43 rears, and I'm going to 
make their lives miserable for 43 years.' Even if Thomas is not 
to be taken literally here, he is the youngest member, and the 
point is well made. Additionally and importantly, Thomas cur-
rently finds himself in the majority most of the time. If George 
W. Bush makes any appointments, he is likely to remain in this 
position for years to come. Being both in the majority and far 
from the median ideological position makes Thomas a likely 
candidate for frequent concurrences in the future. 4 
One reason to devote attention to concurrences is because 
these opinions are the ones potentially less likely to be shaped by 
compromise to please other justices and, therefore, are the opin-
ions best suited for understanding the motivations for and conse-
quences of actions by particular justices. As Baum notes 
A justice who disagrees with the majority opinion 
generally writes or joins in a dissenting or concurring 
opinion. Because they are individual expressions 
rather than statements for the Court, both types of 
opinions can vary a great deal in form and tone. For 
the same reason, they usually reveal more about the 
author's views, and often express those views in 
more colorful language, than do majority opinions 
(2000, 135). 
3 Quoted in Baum (2000, 74). Original source of the quotation is: Neil A. Lewis , "2 Years 
after his bruising hearing, Justice Thomas still shows the hurt," New York Times, 27 
November I 993, p. 6. 
' Moreover, Thomas ' s reticence during oral argument suggests that written opinions 
might be the best, and perhaps sole, location for identifying the Justice 's point of view. 
(We are indebted to an anonymous referee for this observation.) 
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Moreover, Wahlbeck, Spriggs, and Maltzman (1999, 504) 
also note that dissenting opinions tend to be assigned, but con-
curring opinions are entirely self-selecting. 
We seek to understand the way in which justices concur and 
the fonn concurrences take. Our goal is to begin a conversation 
regarding the content of concurrences and to assess whether our 
proposed coding scheme is useful. Beginning with the concur-
rences of one justice seems a reasonable place to start. If these 
codes prove to be instructive regarding concurrence behavior, 
then we will continue this project by extending the examination 
of concurrence content to all the justices of the Rehnquist Court.5 
We begin by discussing the broader significance of concur-
rences, a previously under-studied unit of analysis. Indeed, while 
statistical compilations of opinions are available (see Spaeth 
200 I), little systematic work has been done to explore the con-
tent of concurring opinions. There seems to be general agree-
ment regarding what majority opinions do: they create, change, 
and/or clarify the law. However, scholarly understanding of what 
is accomplished (or not) in concurrences is far less developed. 
We discuss the decline of consensus on the Supreme Court, the 
influence of new institutional approaches on our work, define 
our categories of concurring behavior, put Thomas's opinion 
writing behavior in context, explain what our coding endeavors 
revealed, and make recommendations for future research. 
By engaging in the five types of activity we identify, Thomas 
offers an important piece in the puzzle of concurring behavior. If 
other justices illustrate similar concurring strategies, then justices 
are not merely revealing policy (or attitudinal) preferences, but 
rather to varying degrees are also considering the institutional 
history of the Court's reliance on previous minority opinions to 
provide a basis for future rulings that depart from precedent, 
5 See Way and Turner (2003) . 
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
CLASSIFYING SUP REM£ COURT CONCURRENCES 143 
providing potential litigants with strategies, and attempting to 
narrow the legal reasoning of the Court. 
THE DECLINE OF CONSENSUS 
Separate opinions have been criticized for diminishing the 
Court's opinion, the weight of law, and the legitimacy of courts 
(Walker, Epstein, and Dixon 1988; Ulmer 1970). Concurrences 
especially have been ridiculed as "judicial egocentrism" (Cal-
deira and Zorn 1998, 877). One defense of concurring and dis-
senting opinions is that they indicate that the case has "received 
careful consideration" (Moorhead 1952, 822). Yet, as O'Brien 
(1996, 322) aptly put it, "When individual opinions are more 
highly prized than opinions for the Court, consensus declines and 
the Court's rulings and policy-making appear more fragmented, 
less stable, and less predictable ." Hence, an argument made in 
the literature is that the rise of concurrences indicates a decline 
in consensual norms. However, if many concurrences simply 
note for the record a clarifying point of little significance, their 
presence may not undermine the strength of majority opinions. 
On the other hand, the majority of concurrences may fundamen-
tally undermine the reasoning of the Court's opinion by offering 
different legal tests than those used by the majority. Since there 
has been no systematic review of the content of concurrences, 
these questions remain largely unanswered. 
Widespread court dissension arose in the twentieth century. 
Some scholars argue that the declining norm of consensus began 
with the Stone Court (Walker, Epstein, and Dixon 1988) and oth-
ers argue that perhaps consensual norms of the Court showed 
signs of diminishing as early as the Hughes (Haynie 1992) or 
Taft Courts (Caldeira and Zorn 1998, 892). O'Brien (1999, 103) 
attributes the beginning of the rise of concurrences and dissents 
to FDR's New Deal appointees who "infused American Legal 
Realism and liberal legalism into the Court" and began revealing 
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their disagreements through opinions. The rise of minority opin-
ions has been largely, but not solely, attributed to the leadership 
priorities or style of Chief Justices (Walker, Epstein, and Dixon 
1998; Haynie 1992; Caldeira and Zorn 1998). Other possible 
influences on the rise of concurrences and dissents include the 
increase in the number of law clerks and secretaries as well as 
the introduction of computer technology, which has made it eas-
ier for justices to pen numerous opinions (O'Brien 1999). 
In addition to documenting the decline of consensus, scholars 
have begun to reveal when or under what conditions it is likely 
that justices will author or join concurrences or dissents.6 Ulmer 
(1970) argued that personal characteristics about a justice, such 
as religion and background as a lawyer, influence one's likeli-
hood to dissent. Gerber and Park ( 1997) found that the members 
of the Rehnquist Court were more nonconsensual on the Su-
preme Court than they had been on the appellate courts on which 
they sat, and ultimately concluded that what mattered most re-
garding the behavior of Supreme Court justices was the justices' 
policy preferences. The team of Wahlbeck, Spriggs and Maltz-
man has done a particularly good job of discussing when, and 
perhaps why, justices concur or dissent. For example, they found 
that Burger Court ( 1999) justices were less likely to concur when 
they were ideologically close to the majority opinion writer, 
when they frequently sided with the majority opinion writer, and 
it was near the end of the term. The documented decline of con-
sensus on the Court and explanations of when justices are likely 
to write concurrences and dissents have contributed to a broader 
understanding of judicial decision-making. Though scholars are 
6
"Studies of state courts illustrate that method of opinion assignment, presence of an 
intermediate appellate court, and method of judicial selection ( election or appointment) 
affect judicial consensus (Hall and Brace 1989). Jaros and Canon (1971) also found that 
the presence of an intermediate level appellate court influences dissent rate. Such find-
ings might help explain the d~namics of the Supreme Court. 
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beginning to reveal when concurrences are likely to be written, 
still absent is what justices are writing about in those concur-
rences. In the next section we discuss how new institutional 
work has informed our examination of the content of concur-
rences. 
MAKING MEANING OF CONTENT 
While clearly much has been learned by thorough examina-
tions of judicial votes on particular cases, public law scholars 
have begun to emphasize the need to look beyond votes as re-
flections of justices' policy preferences. New institutionalism has 
reminded political scientists of the power of institutional devel-
opment and incentives and constraints of particular institutional 
configurations. Public law scholars have begun to embrace the 
central tenets of new institutionalism and produce a wide variety 
of works using this approach (e.g., Clayton and Gillman 1999; 
Gillman and Clayton 1999). 7 Informed by such approaches we 
contend that concurrences may provide evidence regarding how 
justices consider the institutional legitimacy of the Court, how 
they deal with precedent as a constraint on and/or tool for their 
decision making, how politics are constituted within the Court, 
and how they feed political discourse by attending to particular 
positions. Clayton and Gillman argue that "it is only with refer-
ence to the goals and motivations of the justices, not just to their 
votes, that we can explore some of the characteristics of the 
Court as an institution and its relationship to larger political 
structures" (1999, 2). It might just be that indications of justices' 
"goal and motivations" lie in separate opinions. 
7 Also see Smith ( 1997) for a compelling argument regarding various traditions that are 
part of American Cc'lstitutional and legal development. 
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One of the many contributions of new institutional ap-
proaches has been to reemphasize an old tenet of the (pre-
behaviorialist) legal model-precedent matters. While Court 
scholars have not ignored this important aspect of the legal sys-
tem, the focus on attitudes and policy preferences often says lit-
tle about the influence of legal precedent. 8 An examination of the 
text of concurrences may reveal the influence of stare decisis, 
which is often discussed as an institutional constraint or consid-
eration. Furthermore, concurrences may include a variety of 
messages to potential litigants regarding the types of arguments 
to which they are sympathetic (see Signaling below). Such be-
havior clearly bestows some credibility on particular positions 
and may contribute to political discourse in a particular ideologi-
cal direction. With the major tenets of new institutionalism in 
mind, we developed five different categories for describing con-
currences that we believe will further understanding of the Court 
and its justices. 
Thematic Analysis 
For these categories to be meaningful, and eventually helpful 
to other scholars and court watchers, we needed to elucidate the 
codes in a thorough manner-such that an individual reading any 
concurrence would categorize that concurrence in the same man-
ner we would. In this section we discuss how we went about 
coding each concurrence and thoroughly describe each type of 
concurrence behavior. In order to compare the content of concur-
rences, we employ thematic analysis. This process provides for 
the categorization of qualitative information; it helps make 'thick 
description' comparable. 9 In this project, thematic analysis in-
1 Of course, the exception to this is discussing precedent as something to be circumvented 
if justices do not agree with it. 
9 For a discussion of this method, see Boyatzis (1998). 
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volved the development of a set of codes for identifying recur-
ring themes, goals, and effects in concurring opinions. Based on 
existing theories about the purposes of concurring opinions, we 
created some initial categories for describing concurrences. 
Next, we began a detailed reading of each of Thomas's concur-
rences. Specifically, we looked for both particular phrases, in-
cluding key words, in an opinion and the general goal of the 
concurrence, which could be traced back to the text of the opin-
ion. For example, a phrase such as, "I write separately to note 
that the majority is using the wrong legal test" would be clear 
indication that the concurrence was Groundlaying (as we will 
describe the code below). Turner read first and coded the opin-
ions according to the typology described in Table 1. Turner fur-
ther refined the categories during the course of the analysis and 
assigned multiple codes to cases when appropriate. 10 Next, Way 
read and coded the cases independently in order to assure inter-
rater reliability. After we both completed coding, we identified 
any disagreements and re-read those cases. The initial ~eement 
rate was 79%; re-reading increased that figure to 85%. 1 All re-
maining discrepancies were eliminated in conference. While 
there has been an increase in the use of computer software to 
code texts (e.g., NUD*IST, WordStat), such technology is not 
well-suited to this project due to the nature of the opinions. Spe-
cifically, justices often refer back to previous cases and the posi-
tions they took in prior opinions and it is necessarily to be 
familiar with those references in order to accurately understand 
'
0 In other words, cases that both signaled future litigants and defended a particular inter-
pretive approach were assigned two codes, one for each behavior exhibited . 
11 This coding procedure follows, in part, the very thorough process described in Appen-
dix B of Richards and Kritzer (2002) . Regard ing percentage agreement as a method of 
assessing interrater reliability Boyatzis ( 1998, 156) notes: "Typically, scores of 70% or 
better are considered necessary in this type of research." 
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the point the justice is making. Hence, this is work that needs to 
be done the old fashioned way. 
Ground/aying. These categories require further elaboration 
and examples. Groundlaying cases are those in which the author 
Category 
Groundlaying 
Signaling 
Preserving 
Defending 
Weakening 
TABLE 1 
TYPES OF CONCURRENCES 
Description 
establishes an alternative test or interpretation for 
possible future use; points to a different part of the 
Constitution or different statute than does the major-
ity opinion 
speculates on how the justice might decide future 
cases; indicates to future litigants what types of 
cases to bring or arguments to make; goes out of the 
way to discuss issues not in contention 
provides a descriptive history; 'just noting" for the 
record; sometimes expresses a warning or expresses 
annoyance 
defends a philosophical or interpretive approach 
( e.g., original intent, judicial restraint) 
narrows the scope of the majority opinion (and, 
therefore, its stare decisis power) by specifically 
pointing to disagreements with the majority opinion 
declares an interpretive difference with the majority opinion and 
often presents an alternative strategy for deciding such cases. 
The justice may lay out the possibility of applying a different test 
or standard for a case or class of cases, possibly in hopes of a 
Court majority adopting that approach in the future. He or she 
might also point out the majority's flaws without specifying a 
preferred alternative. To illustrate this last point, consider Tho-
mas's writing in United States v. Morrison. In this case, which 
addressed the Violence Against Women Act, Thomas concurs 
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The majority opinion correctly applies our decision in 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and I 
join it in full. I write separately only to express my 
view that the very notion of a "substantial effects" 
test under the Commerce Clause is inconsistent with 
the original understanding of Congress' powers and 
with this Court's early Commerce Clause cases .12 
This opinion suggests that in the future Thomas would be 
open to abolishing the use of the substantial effects test when 
considering Commerce Clause cases. That is quite a departure 
from the modem Court's interpretation of this clause and sug-
gests that the Justice's opinion could lay the foundation for fu-
ture endorsement of his approach. This concurring strategy 
achieves the objective of distinguishing the author's path to the 
disposition from that taken by the majority or plurality. If the 
issue at hand is one the justice has addressed previously, the 
opinion may be quite short, merely referencing a disagreement in 
a previous case. For example, in Greater New Orleans Broad-
casting Association v. UnitRd States Thomas writes: "I continue 
to adhere to my view that .. . the Central Hudson test should not 
be applied."t 3 In doing so, he briefly quotes his concurrence 
from 44 Liqourmart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, a case from three 
years earlier. 14 
Signaling. In Signaling cases, the justice goes beyond merely 
stating a difference of opinion and discusses directly the points 
of law that he or she would like to revisit in a future case. 15 
These concurrences say very specifically that Thomas would like 
to review a particular case or would have liked to discuss a spe-
cific point of law but neither the petitioner nor the respondent 
12 529 U.S. 598 (2000) . 
11 527 U.S. 173 (1999) . 
14 517 U.S. 484 (1996) . 
" O'Brien ( 1996, 327) also uses the term signal in this way and notes that Justice Stevens 
finds such writings to be advisory opinions. 
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raised the issue in the case at hand. Serving as a signal to poten-
tial litigants, the opinion states a willingness to take the Court's 
reasoning further in an area of law, or even to change directions, 
or break with precedent. Thomas signals his dissatisfaction with 
precedent in Cooper Industries , Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 
Inc. when he writes: "I continue to believe that the Constitution 
does not constrain the size of punitive damage awards . ... For 
this reason, given the opportunity, I would vote to overrule 
BMW. This case, however , does not present such an opportu-
nity." 16 Sometimes , the issue the justice is signaling differs from 
the point of law under consideration in the present case. In such 
instances, the justice appears to be going out of his or her way to 
discuss a tangential point, or a point that the justice hoped the 
parties would have addressed in their briefs. Thomas si?,nals his 
broader views on gun control in Printz v. United States. In this 
case, the point of law that litigants and the majority opinion dis-
cuss is the Tenth Amendment. Thomas, though, extrapolates 
This Court has not had recent occasion to consider 
the nature of the substantive right safeguarded by the 
Second Amendment. If, however, the Second 
Amendment is read to confer a personal right to 
"keep and bear arms," a colorable argument exists 
that the Federal Government's regulatory scheme, at 
least as it pertains to the purely intrastate sale or pos-
session of firearms, runs afoul of that Amendment's 
protections. As the parties did not raise this argu-
ment, however, we need not consider it here. 18 
It would be difficult for interested potential litigants to over-
look such a plain statement of Thomas's willingness to recon-
sider the direction of the Court's jurisprudence regarding the 
Second Amendment. His last phrase seems slightly ironic as he 
16 532 U.S. 424 (2001). 
17 521 U.S. 898 (1997) . 
11 /bid ., foohlotes omitted . 
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clearly is considering the issue to the extent that he wrote a con-
currence on the topic. 
Preserving. The Preserving approach is one in which the jus-
tice presents arguments or historical descriptions that seem to 
hold little utility for future jurisprudence. These opinions may 
describe portions of American history, legal or otherwise, or they 
may be expressions of the justice's reasoning process that, for 
whatever reason, he or she wishes to preserve in writing. An ex-
ample of a Preserving concurrence that is merely recording his-
torical description is Capitol Square v. Pinette in which 
Thomas's concurrence of four paragraphs relates the history of 
the Ku Klux Klan's use of burning crosses. 19 His point, for the 
record, was that such an act was political and not religious in 
nature. The tone of such opinions can range from mundane re-
flection to pithy annoyance with other members of the Court to 
full blown jeremiad warning the reader of the dangers of the ma-
jority's interpretation. As an example of this latter tone, consider 
Thomas's statement in Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board: "I 
fully anticipate ... that as a result of today's holding, all of the 
problems we have experienced in §2 vote dilution cases will now 
be replicated and, indeed, exacerbated in the §5 retrogression 
inquiry."20 This proclamation warns of future dangers, but as 
these dangers exist in a section of the law that the present case 
does not touch, all Thomas can do is lament. Criticizing a dis-
senting opinion, as well, has little bearing on the present course 
of law, but a justice may wish to preserve the arguments against 
the dissent in case future jurists are tempted by its reasoning. 
Justice Thomas demonstrates this desire to have his observations 
preserved 'for the record' in United Dominion Industries v. 
United States when he states: "I write separately, however, be-
19 515 U.S. 753 (1995) . 
20 520 U.S . 471 (1997) . 
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cause I respectfully disagree with the dissent's suggestion that, 
when a provision of the Code and the corresponding regulations 
are ambiguous, this Court should defer to the Government's in-
terpretation."21 While Preserving opinions take many forms, they 
all present a minor, or even non-germane, clarification of the 
Justice's views. 
Defending. The Defending concurrence is an effort to defend 
an approach to legal philosophy that spans beyond the confines 
of the present case. Occasionally the majority opinion, or a dis-
sent, provokes a justice into writing separately in order to cham-
pion a philosophical or interpretive approach, such as original 
intent or judicial restraint. These opinions illustrate a broader 
ideological divide than a particular case and instead advocate a 
judicial philosophy. There are relatively few such broad philoso-
phies-the Constitution as a living document, textualism, origi-
nal intent, for example. The approach taken by another opinion 
might lead the concurring justice to extol the importance of 
common law antecedents, or defend analyzing the plain meaning 
of the text prior to a consideration of legislative intent. On this 
point, consider Thomas's concurrence in Cornell Johnson v. 
United States: "I agree with the Court's textual analysis ... and 
think that analysis sufficient to resolve this case .... I would not 
rely, as the Court ... and Justice Kennedy ... do, on any apparent 
congressional purpose supporting the Court's reading of 
§3583(e)(3)." 22 In these concurrences the justice is not simply 
stating that a different test should be used in this particular case 
(which would be coded Groundlaying), but rather that a different 
approach should be used in an entire body of cases. For example, 
original intent should be examined when deciding any claim in-
volving the Establishment Clause, or a plain reading of the text 
21 532 U.S. 822 (2001) . 
22 529 U.S. 694 (2000) . 
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should be used when interpreting Congressional legislation. 
Thomas illustrates this type of concurrence in Farmer v. Bren-
nan : "the Court's prison condition jurisprudence bas been 
guided, not by the text of the Constitution, but rather by 'evolv-
ing standards of decency' . . .I continue to doubt the legitimacy of 
that mode of constitutional decision-making . . .. "23 In such con-
currences Thomas takes issue not just with a majority opinion, 
but with a larger interpretive approach. 
Weakening. Finally, the Weakening concurrence is one in 
which the justice narrows the scope and authority of the majority 
opinion by emphasizing the points at which he or she departs 
from the majority's reasoning. Often, this has the effect of nar-
rowing the breadth of the Court's opinion in some way, possibly 
turning parts of the majority opinion into a non-controlling plu-
rality. We expected this to occur most often in special concur-
rences that concur only in part or in the judgment. It is important 
to note here that the Weakening category is not a psychological 
assessment of the author; we make no claims that the writer is 
intentionally seeking to muddle the Court's decision, or weaken 
the Court as an institution. We merely suggest that some concur-
rences have this effect. As Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck 
(2000, 68) note : "a concurring opinion can ultimately serve as a 
sanction by articulating flaws in the majority opinion. By provid-
ing alternative ways to view the legal rule underlying the major-
ity opinion, separate opinions can influence how the majority 
opinion is perceived, and even implemented, by judges, political 
decision makers, or private parties. In this sense, separate opin-
ions possibly weaken the precedential basis of an opinion." 
Indeed, the breadth of the stare decisis power of Lynce v. 
Mathis is likely compromised when Justice Thomas writes: ''Un-
der these narrow circumstances, I agree with the Court that the 
23 511 U.S. 825 (1994) . 
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State's retroactive nullification of petitioner's previously ac-
crued, and then used, release credits violates the Constitution's 
ban on ex post-facto lawmaking. I do not, however, join the ma-
jority's discussion of Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981), 
which I find unnecessary to the resolution of this case. "24 In an-
other concurrence, Republic National Bank of Miami v. US., 
Thomas wrote, "I cannot join the Court's discussion of jurisdic-
tion because that discussion is unnecessary and may very well 
constitute an advisory opinion." 25 Whether it is Thomas's goal or 
not, such opinions have a potentially weakening--or at least nar-
rowing-effect on the majority opinion. 
If justices are not engaging in serious doctrinal work in their 
concurrences, then we would expect that the most frequent cate-
gory would be Preserving. If, however, justices use concurrences 
to set the framework for a change in how particular areas of case 
law are determined, then we would expect to see a high percent-
age of Groundlaying and Weakening concurrences. A high per-
centage of Defending concurrences would indicate that justices 
are using concurrences to advocate a particular philosophy, 
which may or may not be linked to case outcomes. Finally, if 
justices frequently engage in Signaling behavior in their concur-
rences, then perhaps they are comfortable indicating the types of 
arguments they are open to and, by extension, are granting le-
gitimacy to specific political positions. 
While there are certainly concurrences that exhibit only one 
type of concurring behavior, there is no reason to asswne that 
justices engage in just one of these categories in each concur-
rence. In fact, we asswne that in many cases justices will engage 
in more than one type of concurrence behavior. For example, it 
makes perfect sense that a justice might both note his or her 
24 519 U.S. 433 ( 1997). 
lS 506 U.S. 80 ( 1992). 
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TABLE2 
JUSTICES' VOTES AND 0PINIONS 2 1991-2000 TERMS 
Justice/ Voting Behavior Authored Opinions Decision Type 
Thomas Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
majority or plurality 822 72.7 83 37 .2 
dissent 183 16.2 72 32.3 
regular concurrence 61 6.4 39 25.8 
special concurrence 65 6.8 29 19.2 
Total 1131 223 
Rehnquist 
majority or plurality 990 85.0 109 61.2 
dissent 140 12.0 49 27 .5 
regular concurrence 16 1.6 12 9.3 
special concurrence 19 1.9 8 6.2 
Total 1165 178 
Stevens 
majority or plurality 670 57.8 95 21.l 
dissent 346 29.9 233 51.7 
regular concurrence 59 7.3 51 23.3 
special concurrence 84 10.3 72 33 .0 
Total 1159 451 
O'Connor 
majority or plurality 930 80.5 105 44.9 
dissent 125 10.8 61 26 .l 
regular concurrence 61 5.9 44 25.4 
special concurrence 39 3.8 24 13.9 
Total 1155 234 
Scalia 
majority or plurality 837 72.2 97 30.8 
dissent 177 15.3 95 30 .2 
regular concurrence 73 7.4 63 28.6 
special concurrence 72 7.3 60 27.2 
Total 1159 315 
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preference for a different legal test than the majority (Groundlay-
ing) and indicate that he or she would have voted differently had 
the plaintiff raised this particular legal issue (Signaling) in the 
same opinion. While, of course, there is generally a desire for 
categories to be mutually exclusive, we think in this case such a 
scheme would oversimplify the variety of behaviors contained in 
concurrences. With a more thorough understanding of the cate-
gories in mind, the following section explains Thomas's voting 
behavior and opinion writing compared to his fellow Rehnquist 
Court members. 
Thomas In Context 
Before examining the substance of Thomas's opinions 
specifically, we will situate his separate writing within the 
broader institutional context. Justice Thomas took his seat on the 
Court October 23, 1991 and took part in his first case on No-
vember 4, 1991. As seen below in Table 2, Justice Thomas took 
part in either a regular or special concurrence about 13.2% of the 
time in which he voted with the majority during his first decade 
on the bench. During this period, only Stevens (17.6%), Scalia 
(14.7%), and Breyer (13.4%) concurred more often. Concur-
rences comprised 45% of Thomas's non-dissenting written opin-
ions, the third highest percentage behind Stevens (56.3%) and 
Scalia (55.8%). In numbers of concurrences, Thomas's 68 pmany 
concurrences as Stevens and Scalia (both with 123).26 While 
Thomas is not the most prolific concurrer, these comparisons 
26 Ginsburg and Breyer have fewer due to a shorter period on the bench during the time 
period under investigation . Rehnquist 's paltry concurrence totals are consistent with 
previous findings regarding the tendency of chief justices to refrain from writing sepa-
rately (for example, see Wahlbeck, Spriggs , and Maltzman 1999; Maltzman, Spriggs, and 
Wahlbeck 2000) . Scalia 's high number is perhaps not surprising , as he has publicly em-
braced concurrences (Scal ia 1994). 
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TABLE2 
JUSTICES' VOTES AND OPINIONS, 1991-2000 TERMS 
(continued) 
Justice/ 
Decision Type 
Kennedy 
majority or plurality 
dissent 
regular concurrence 
special concurrence 
Total 
Souter 
majority or plurality 
dissent 
regular concurrence 
special concurrence 
Total 
Ginsburg 
majority or plurality 
dissent 
regular concurrence 
special concurrence 
Total 
Breyer 
majority or plurality 
dissent 
regular concurrence 
special concurrence 
Total 
Voting Behavior 
Frequency Percent 
1001 85.7 
75 6.4 
51 4.7 
41 3.8 
1168 
905 
159 
61 
40 
1165 
634 
146 
53 
29 
862 
512 
137 
50 
29 
728 
77.7 
13.6 
6.1 
4.0 
73.5 
16.9 
7.4 
4.1 
70.3 
18.8 
8.5 
4.9 
Authored Opinions 
Frequency 
93 
30 
38 
27 
188 
91 
64 
37 
25 
217 
73 
49 
34 
16 
172 
58 
69 
25 
15 
167 
Percent 
49.5 
16.0 
24.1 
17.1 
41.9 
29.5 
24.2 
17.1 
42.4 
28.5 
27.6 
13.0 
34.7 
41.3 
25.5 
15.3 
Data derived from Spaeth (200 I). Data for Justice Ginsburg begin with 1993 and for 
Justice Breyer begin with 1994. For concurrences, percent is calculated as the percent 
of cases in which the justice concurred out of the total number in which he or she 
voted with the majority. 
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indicate that he is more likely than most other justices both to 
concur and to author his own concurrence. Though concurrences 
are the most likely types of opinions to be signed by a single in-
dividual, 13 of Thomas's 68 concurrences were joined by an-
other justice, Scalia in each case. The relationship betweenlace 
him slightly above the median, though he wrote just over half as 
these two conservative justices appears even stronger when one 
observes that these 13 cases comprise 52% of all the cases in 
which Scalia joined another justice's concurrence during this 
decade.27 
Wahlbeck, Spriggs, and Maltzrnan (1999) found that Burger 
Court justices were less likely to author concurrences when jus-
tices who are ideologically closer to the justice in question write 
the majority. Caldeira and Zorn (I 998) also see the nonn of re-
ciprocity as a likely factor that influences the choice of justices 
regarding whether to write separately or not. Furthennore, they 
found that justices who often cooperate with one another are less 
likely to write concurrences when the colleague whom the jus-
tice cooperates with writes the majority opinion. Consistent with 
this research, Thomas was significantly less likely to concur 
when Rehnquist or Scalia authored the opinion of the court. 28 
Hence, in various ways Thomas is not so atypical in his concur-
ring behavior as to make him an undesirable candidate for the 
evaluation of our proposed codes. 29 
27 Likewise, Thomas joined 40 of Scalia's concurrences , representing 63% of all the 
concurrences Thomas joined . The connection between these two jurists is well-
documented. The American Lawyer (2001) , for example, reports that Scalia and Thomas 
have been in vote alignment between 82.8% and 97. 7% percent of the time for each term 
between 1991 and 2000 (reprinted in "Friends and Foes" 200 I) . 
21 Examining all cases where Thomas voted with the majority disposition, the correlation 
between a Scalia or Rehnquist authored majority and Thomas writing a concurrence was 
negative and significant (the Pearson correlation is -.070 at p < . I 0, one-tailed). 
29 Of course for many research questions Thomas would not be a good candidate ( e.g., an 
examination of nomination politics) , but such concerns should not be the case given our 
particular focus. 
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REVEALING CONCURRING BEHAVIOR 
We categorized all sixty of Thomas's concurrences for analy-
sis .30 Frequencies are reported in Table 3. Thomas's most preva-
lent concurring behavior was Groundlaying at over 58%. 
Groundlaying concurrences are those engaging in substantive 
legal departures from the majority's reasoning. As the theme 
most typical of Thomas's concurrences, Groundlaying offers 
some important insights into the act of concurring. First, it 
clearly establishes that a justice does not have to dissent in order 
to take issue with the majority's legal reasoning in an area of law. 
On several occasions Thomas used a concurrence to establish his 
TABLE3 
FREQUENCIES FOR OPINION CHARACTERISTICS 
Characteristic 
Groundlaying 
Signaling 
Preserving 
Defending 
Weakening 
Yes 
35 (58.3%) 
19 (31.7%) 
24 (40.0%) 
15 (25.0%) 
14 (23.3%) 
position favoring, for example , the use of strict scrutiny in com-
mercial speech cases . Second, the prevalence of Groundlaying 
supports scholars' contentions that a rise in concurrences may 
indicate a factitious Court.3' For example, in Bank of America v. 
203 North LaSalle Street Partnership, Thomas disagrees with the 
majority's interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code and offers what 
1° For the purposes of the stat istical analysis, I case (Holder v. Hall) was removed as an 
outlier, making N = 59 for those tests. This total is slightly smaller than that found by 
Spaeth due to differences in coding decisions which concur in part and dissent in part . 
11 O'Brien (I 996, 285) offers that this may be because there is less deliberation and com-
promise about opinions due to a heavy workload. 
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is, to his mind, a clearer alternative. 32 Declaring a different path 
of reasoning indicates that, regardless of the case disposition, 
there is a lack of agreement in an area of law that extends be-
yond what vote totals, as traditionally calculated, reveal. In fact, 
Groundlaying behavior was positively correlated with writing a 
special concurrence .33 Finally, Groundlaying may be an impor-
tant precursor to future interpretive changes. Though we do not 
measure the ultimate effects of this phenomenon, the fact that 
Groundlaying concurrences present an alternative approach sup-
ported by at least one member of the Court suggests that this al-
ternative could be a leading contender for the majority's 
interpretation in the future. For example, if Thomas stakes out 
his position favoring strict scrutiny in commercial speech in a 
series of concurrences, then if Thomas ever has the opportunity 
to construct a majority opinion on a case in this area of law, it 
seems likely that this is the interpretive approach he would take. 
While this claim is speculative, the prevalence of Groundlaying 
concurrences suggests this scenario may be worthy of more at-
tention in the future. 
Thomas Signaled 31. 7% of the time. In nearly one-third of 
his concurrences, Thomas indicated that he would like to over-
rule a particular case or review an entire body of precedent. 
However, he clearly indicated that when litigants did not ask him 
to review a previous case, he saw it as inappropriate to do so. He 
might say, for example, that he did not agree that a precedent had 
been properly decided, but since the parties in the present case 
had accepted the precedent, he felt he must as well. These Sig-
naling concurrences illustrate the power of institutional norms on 
the Court. 34 Thomas is clearly indicating that he does not agree 
32 526 U.S. 434 (1999). 
33 The Pearson correlation is .392 at p < .0 I, one-tailed. 
" See Kahn ( 1999) for more on the institutional constraint of stare decisis, 
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with rulings but is unwilling to consider overruling them until a 
party specifically asks him to do so.35 The following are a couple 
of examples of such behavior. In Georgia v. McCol/um Thomas 
writes 
As a matter of first impression, I think that I would 
have shared the view of the dissenting opinions: A 
criminal defendant's use of peremptory strikes cannot 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment because it does 
not involve state action. Yet, I agree with the Court 
and the Chief Justice that our decision last tenn in 
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. governs this 
case and requires the opposite conclusion. Because 
the respondents do not question Edmonson, I believe 
that we must accept its consequences. I therefore 
concur in the judgment .. . [ emphasis added].36 
Thomas even expressed such sentiments in an area of law in 
which he has strongly advocated that the Court has been mis-
guided. For example, the entire concurrence in South Central 
Bell v. Alabama consists of "I join the opinion of the Court. I 
agree that it would be inappropriate to take up the State's invita-
tion to reconsider our negative Commerce Clause doctrine in this 
case because 'the State did not make clear it intended to make 
this argument until it filed its brief on the merits.' Ante, at 10. "37 
He seems to be indicating to potential future litigants that they 
should not make the same mistake. 
Often, Thomas's Signals were not narrow, but rather indicated 
that the justice disagrees with an entire area of Supreme Court 
rulings. We think it is worth noting that he does not indicate once 
that he disagrees with a body of precedent, but instead repeatedly 
JS These opinions seem to ignore the power of the Court's ability to define the issue in the 
case largely as they wish. See McGuire and Palmer (1995) on issue fluidity . 
16 505 U.S. 42 (1992) . 
"526 U.S. 160 (1999) . 
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writes concurrences saying so in multiple cases regarding that 
area of the law. This seems to be especially the case in Com-
merce Clause, vote dilution, and commercial speech cases. 
Hence, in a few areas of law he repeatedly engages in Signaling 
concurrence behavior.38 Such opinions point to a seeming judi-
cial activism as he is essentially asking litigants to bring him 
cases (Werrniel 2002). Perhaps Moorhead (1952, 884) was pro-
phetic when he wrote 
If a concurring or dissenting opinion is not written 
with full respect for stare decisis , it serves neither to 
improve our jurisprudence nor to afford a reliable ba-
sis for prediction . It is one thing to respect the doc-
trine of stare decisis, but, from time to time in a 
dissenting or concurring opinion, to argue that a par-
ticular precedent is wrong or outmoded and should be 
overruled. It is quite a different thing to indulge in an 
iconoclastic endeavor to upset all that has gone be-
fore by making concurring and dissenting opinions 
mere vehicles for the conveyance of pet ideologies .... 
If the decisions of a court are consistently accompa-
nied by concurring or dissenting opinions which rep-
resent attempts to substitute the impulses of the 
present for the wisdom of the past, the law suffers, 
and the only possible prediction is one of chaos. 
Of course, Thomas's response to this is likely to be that he is 
advocating a return to the original understanding of the issue or 
principle in question, which the Court has unfortunately ignored 
for a period of time. 39 
31 This is consistent with Gerber's (1999) portrayal of Thomas as having unique and 
adamant views on these subjects. 
39 U.S. v. Lopez (1995) is an excellent example ofThomas's use of original intent (see 
also Schmidt 1997). It will be interesting in future research to see the degree to which this 
is idiosyncratic for Thomas or whether other justices behave similarly over time on par-
ticular issues. 
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Thomas exhibited Weakening behavior in 23.3% of his con-
currences. Such a percentage would indicate that Thomas is 
comfortable with reducing the scope and/or legitimacy of the 
majority opinion. However, Weakening opinions could do the 
most damage if the court's vote contained a minimum winning 
coalition (typically 5-4 decisions), effectively turning a majority 
opinion from a controlling precedent into a merely persuasive 
plurality opinion. In fact, Thomas was much less likely to write 
Weakening concurrences in such instances. 40 One explanation for 
this behavior is that Thomas is hesitant to exercise his ability to 
Weaken in cases where this action is most likely to have a nega-
tive impact on the legitimacy of the institution and the law. As 
O'Brien (1996) notes, another possible explanation is that the 
majority opinion writer may be more likely to accommodate 
various views in his or her opinion for the Court in minimum 
winning coalition cases because if such a compromise is not 
made, a Court opinion may not result. 
We expected that Weakening concurrences would most often 
be special concurrences in which the justice agrees with the dis-
positional judgment of the Court but not with its reasoning. Spe-
cial concurrences are more likely to weaken the opinion of the 
Court and, therefore, the clarity of the law. A special concur-
rence, then, has greater repercussions for the institutional legiti-
macy of the Court than does a regular concurrence. Thomas did 
not write a single Weakening regular concurrence. In other 
words, he only engaged in Weakening behavior when he was 
writing a special concurrence. That being said, Thomas did write 
special concurrences that we did not code as weakening. Thus, 
"Weakening" and "special concurrence" are not definitionally 
'
0 Thomas wrote a Weakening opinion in only one of the fifteen cases (6. 7%) which had 
a minimum winning coalition . 
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synonymous. Rather, Weakening is best understood as a subset 
of special concurrences. 
We applied the Defending code to 25% of Thomas's opinions. 
In these cases, a justice goes beyond the point of law in the case 
at hand to discuss his or her broader views on legal reasoning. In 
Thomas's case, Defending most often took the form of discuss-
ing original intent. In fact, Thomas explicitly mentions the Fram-
ers in about half of the cases we coded as Defending. In Loving 
v. United States, for example, Thomas spends about one-third of 
his concurrence discussing the Framers' knowledge of English 
military and Parliamentary histo7i, in this case criticizing the 
majority's analysis of that history. 1 In the remainder of Defend-
ing cases, Thomas notes either agreement or disagreement with 
the line of legal reasoning employed in another opinion. In 
United States v. R.L.C., for example, Thomas echoes an argu-
ment made in Scalia's concurrence on the limitations of legisla-
tive history as an interpretive approach. 42 
Opinions that were solely Preserving did nothing more than 
note minor clarifications, argue with a dissent, or present histori-
cal information. These are the opinions that would describe what 
has previously been expected of concurrences-they do little of 
jurisprudential significance. The number of opinions that only 
Preserved was somewhat small-20%. However, a full 40% of 
Thomas's concurrences exhibited Preserving behavior. Hence, he 
often Preserved when he also did other more meaningful tasks. 
In those instances, it was likely a lengthy description of histori-
cal information that led to assignment of the Preserving code. It 
may be the frequent appearance of such obvious dicta that has 
led many to discount the value of concurrences. The fact that 
half of Thomas's concurrences which display this behavior also 
'
1 517 U.S. 748 (1996). 
41 503 U.S. 291 (1992). 
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exhibit another type of concurring behavior may indicate that 
scholars have been too quick to assume that the presence of "ju-
dicial egocentrism" (Caldeira and Zorn 1998, 877) also means an 
absence of substance. 
Thomas's concurrences often met the requirements of more 
than one code. The average number of codes per concurrence 
was 1.78. Therefore, Thomas's concurrences often do more than 
one thing-such as Weaken and Groundlay or Groundlay and 
Signal. In other words, in one section of the concurrence he 
might Groundlay while in another he may Defend. The variety of 
combinations displayed in Table 4 suggests a great degree of 
flexibility in combining strategies. That being said, the vast ma-
jority (79%) of concurrences employ two or fewer types of con-
curring behavior. 
LESSONS LEARNED 
Clearly, concurrences are not politically, legally, or histori-
cally insignificant. Seventy-five percent of Thomas's concur-
rences fall into one of the three jurisprudentially important 
categories: Signaling, Groundlaying, or Weakening. This alone is 
relatively compelling as it is a strong argument for why concur-
rences are opinions worthy of further study. Justice Thomas ex-
hibits a clear willingness to use concurrences to not only indicate 
a particular position, but also to advocate, especially through 
Signaling and Groundlaying. 
The absence of literature on the content of Supreme Court 
concurrences leads one to assume there is not much to learn from 
them. This effort, however, illustrates that not all concurrences 
are alike. In some cases, concurrences are the sites of serious 
doctrinal disagreements. Also, such opinions often include the 
important jurisprudential work of outlining preferred legal doc-
trine for hopeful adoption in the future. Finally, concurrences 
provide a window into the political dynamics of the Court. They 
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illustrate where compromise could not be met in the majority 
opinion and when a justice feels compelled to note his or her 
disagreement with the Court's opinion. 
Maveety (2002, 9) argues that the proliferation of concur-
rences may have "bifurcated judicial policy goal-seeking into 
two, at times mutually exclusive dimensions: policy in case out-
comes, and policy in doctrinal rules." 43 It seems that a justice's 
vote with the majority would indicate his or her "policy in case 
outcomes" preferences, while the content of his or her concur-
rence indicates a "doctrinal" preference. Thomas is using concur-
rences to seek both of his preferences; rather than suppressing 
his doctrinal preferences, he chooses to write them in the concur-
rences, perhaps due to the ebb of consensual norms. One can 
also see from the content of these concurrences both the institu-
TABLE4 
FREQUENCIES OF CODE COMBINATIONS 
Characteristic 
Cases assigned only one code 
Groundlaying only 
Signaling only 
Preserving only 
Defending only 
Weakening only 
Cases assigned two codes 
Cases assigned three or more codes 
Frequency 
28 (47.0%) 
IO 
4 
12 
I 
I 
19 (32.0%) 
13 (22.0%) 
tional constraint of stare decisis and one justice's attempt to 
thwart it by signaling to future litigants that they must specifi-
cally argue against a precedent in order for the Court to consider 
overturning it. 
0 See also Baum ( 1997) on justices' pursuit of legal and policy goals. 
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With the preceding lessons learned, we will continue (and en-
courage others to continue) to explore the significance of sepa-
rate opinions. Our future work will compare the concurring 
behavior of members of the Rehnquist Court and consider what 
might explain variation in content. We will also consider whether 
Rehnquist Court justices are so comfortable with the collapse of 
consensus norms that they have all begun to write Weakening 
concurrences at a rate that could compromise both the institution 
of the Court and legal clarity. It will also be interesting to see 
whether justices considered conservative and liberal concur in 
similar fashion. Finally, do those who claim to be advocates of 
judicial restraint write different kinds of opinions than do their 
more activist colleagues? These are all important questions for 
further study. 
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